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ABSTRACT

In this paper we construct an equilibrium model to formalize Coase's idea
on the function of the firm in improving transaction efficiency. The relation
ship between the division of labor, economic growth, and the evolution of ec
onomic institutions are investigated.
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AN APPROACH TO MODELING INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

I.

Introduction

This past year is the 50th anniversary of the publication of Coase's pa
per [1937], "The Nature of the Firm."

Coase's central thesis is that differ

ences in transaction costs lead to the emergence of firms as a replacement for
some markets. The institution of the firm can be used to take advantage of
long-term contracts in order to save transaction costs. He argued that the
division of labor and uncertainty are not major attributes of the firm because
the division of labor can be organized by the market rather than by a firm and
uncertainty can be used to justify a need for risk markets rather than for
firms. 2
The relationship between the emergence of the firm and the improvement of
transaction efficiency has been reconsidered in many papers on this topic.
Many authors extend and refine Coase's theory, e.g.

Cheung [1982) and Alchian

[1972). Cheung and Alchian hold that not only transaction costs but also the
relationship between transaction costs and the division of labor is important

1

I would like to thank Gene Grossman, Barry Nalebuff, Edwin Mills, T. N.
Srinivasan, Raaj Sah for helpfull comments. Financial Supports from the
Ford Foundation and the Open Society Fund are gratefully acknowledged.

2

Kihlstrom and Laffont's model about uncertainty and the firm [1979) can be
only used to justify a need for the risk market because the authors did not
explain why wage contracts are more efficient than other market contract
arrangements in trading uncertainty, e.g. insurance and stock trade in the
markets.
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for the emergence of the firm.

Cheung points out that the growth of the firm

may be viewed as the replacement of a product market by a factor market, resulting in a savings in transaction costs.

Alchian holds that there is a

market within a firm. This market and the markets between firms and consumers
may develop simultaneously.
Some economists who follow the transaction-cost approach, e.g.

William

son [ 1985], hold that the neoclassical framework of utility and production
functions is inappropriate for describing economic institutions.

In contrast

to this opinion, I hold that the neoclassical framework of utility and pro
duction functions can be used to describe the evolution of institutions if the
way that production function is specified is appropriately refined.
Because most economists who follow the transaction-cost approach take the
gains from trade as stemming only from comparative advantages, the relation
ship between the evolution of the equilibrium level of division of labor and
transaction efficiency cannot be well understood, although the relation between the firm and transaction costs has been discussed extensively.

Such

discussion will produce a partial view of the role of the firm and cannot shed
light on the general relationship between the evolution of division of labor
and the evolution of the institution of the firm.
In Yang [1986], the different implications of transaction efficiency for
economies with and without increasing returns to specialization are indicated.
For an economy with comparative advantages and without increasing returns to
specialization, the utility frontier defined by the Pareto optimum is consis
tent with the production possibility frontier (PPF). But for an economy with
increasing returns to specialization, the utility frontier may differ from the
PPF because there exists a trade-off between increasing returns to speciali-
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zation and transaction costs. For such an economy, an improvement of trans
action efficiency will move the utility frontier closer to the PPF and move
equilibrium productivity closer to that associated with the PPF.

If the con

tract arrangement adopted by the firm can improve transaction efficiency, then
such a contract arrangement may promote the equilibrium level of division of
labor because this level is an increasing function of transaction efficiency.
However, if the division of labor is based only on comparative advantage,. then
the implications of improved transaction efficiency will not have effects of
this sort. Then the impacts of transaction efficiency on the evolution of in
stitutions is

limited.

This improvement will not lead to the progress of

productivity and the evolution of institutions and the market system.
Whereas most literature on the transaction-cost approach ignores increas
ing returns to scale (IRS), many excellent studies of economic growth stemming
from IRS, e.g. Romer [1986], Lucas [1986], Schultz [1986], Vassilakis [1986]
ignore the importance of transaction costs in an economy with IRS. The liter
ature thus cannot highlight the relationship between the evolution of division
of labor and the evolution of the institution of the firm either.

It appears

to me that many recent excellent works in trade theory and growth theory have
brought the division of labor based on increasing returns to specialization
into a central place in economics. I believe that a combination of the trans
action-cost approach and the models describing increasing returns to special
ization may be meaningful for such a development and may shed light on the
theory on economic growth, trade, and the evolution of market and economic
institutions.

3

3

Helpman and Krugman [1985] pointed out the importance of transaction costs
for the model with IRS.

However, in their model increasing returns to spe-
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In an insightful paper, Sah and Stiglitz [1986] push the notion of spe
cialization one step further. They point out: "the past half century has been
marked not only by greater specialization in production, but also by greater
specialization in learning." They propose a concept "localized learning" and
argue that the hours spent learning are specific for each individual. This
concept may be used to distinguish increasing returns to specialization from
increasing returns to scale.
Schultz [1986] and Lucas [1986] emphasize the importance of increasing
returns to specialization for economic growth and note the intrinsic connec
tion between increasing returns to specialization and so called "human capi
tal". Schultz stresses the compatibility between increasing returns to specialization and decentralized markets.

He holds that increasing returns to

specialization are a general economic phenomena and the major function of
specialization is to speed up the accumulation of knowledge (human capital).
In this paper, I will combine the theories proposed by Sah, Stiglitz, Lu
cas, and Schultz with the ideas of Coase, Cheung, and Alchian to achieve an
equilibrium model based on micro-production functions with increasing returns
to specialization and Cobb-Douglas utility functions.

Using such a model, I

will show that competitive equilibrium balances a trade-off between the econ
omies of division of labor and transaction costs. Increasing transaction ef
ficiency will lead to greater division of labor. The institution of the firm
would increase the equilibrium level of the division of labor and productivity
if it could be used to improve transaction efficiency.

cialization are not distinguished from increasing returns to scale, so that
the implications

of increasing returns to

specialization combined with

transaction costs to institutional evolution was not addressed.
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In section II, I present the model. In section III, I solve for the indi
vidual decision problems. In section IV, I solve for the equilibrium and the
Pareto optimum using a multiple-step approach. In section V, I derive compar
ative statics of the model set out in the previous sections. Finally I make
some remarks on this model.

11 .

The Model

Let us consider an economy with M consumers/producers. There are two con
sumer goods and one intermediate good (or service) in this economy. The self
provided amount of the two consumer goods are x and y respectively.

By self

provided, we shall mean that quantity of a good produced by an individual for
hls own use. The amounts of two consumer goods sold in the market are xs and
. 1y.
y s respective

The amounts of two consumer goods purchased in the market

are xd and yd respectively.

An "iceberg" type of transaction technology is

,characterized by the coefficient k. Fraction k of a shipment will disappear in
transaction. Thus, (1-k)xd and (1-k)yd are the amounts an individual receives
from the purchases of the two consumer goods respectively.
The amounts consumed of the two goods are x+(l-k)x d and y+(l-k)y d respectively. The utility function is identical for all individuals and given by
(II-1)

This Cobb-Douglas utility function represents a preference for diverse con
sumption. The amount consumed of each good cannot be zero.

A combination of

di.verse consumption and specialized production will base equilibrium on a
trade-off between the gains from trade and transaction costs.
There is a simple iso-elasticity production function for consumer goody:
(II-2)

y + ys = La
y

a > 1
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where y + ys is the output level of goody and L

is the hours used in pra

y

ducing this good.
In producing x, we need intermediate good z.
X

The production function for

is

(II-3a)
where z

X

d

+

X

s

d

= {[z+(l-t)z ]L}

b

X

is the amount of the intermediate good purchased from the market; the

fraction t of zd disappears in transaction. Hence, (1-t)zd is the amount an
individual receives

from the purchase of this intermediate good. z is the

amount self-provided of this good.

L

X

is the hours used in producing consumer

good x. Later we will see that the equilibrium number of firms is greater than
one in the market with firms if 1/2 < b < 1 and this number is one if b
b

>

~

1.

1/2 implies that there are increasing returns to specialization in pro

ducing x.
The production function of z is
zs = Lc
z

(II-3b)

C

)

1

where zs is the amount of the intermediate good sold and L is the hours used
z
in producing z
In

conjuction

(II-2)-(II-3)

with

individual

constraints

on

labor

endowments,

specify a system of production functions for an individual.

Assume that an individual has L units of labor, then the labor endowment con
straint for each individual is
(II-4)

L +L +L =L
X
y
Z

where some L. could be zero. For instance, L
1

duces only z.

X

= L = 0, if an individual proy

This system of production functions is specified for a produc-

er/consumer rather than for the, firm. It exhibits increasing returns to spe
cialization.

According to this production function, each individual always
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may choose to be self-provided in some goods. Based on the concept of local
ized technology proposed by Sah and Stiglitz, we assume that "L" is specific
for each individual.
ual is limited.

The maximal amount of this specific L for each individ

This point distinguishes increasing returns to specialization

from increasing returns to scale. The Mills' production function describes a
positive relation between productivity and the level of specialization.
The combination of increasing returns to specialization, exhibited by the
Mills' production function, and individual preference for diverse consumption,
will set up a trade-off between the gains from the division of labor and
transaction costs. The market equilibrium will balance this trade-off. The
improvement of transaction efficiency will raise this equilibrium level of
division of labor.

Such improvement may be caused either

transaction technology or by institutional innovation.

by progress of

The latter case is

where the setting of the firm may play its role.
111.

Individual Optimal Decisions

I assume free entry for all individuals into any sector and a large M.
These assumptions imply that individuals treat prices parametrically.
As in Yang [1986], an individual must solve for a corner solution for
each structure and his decision making process consists of two steps. In the
first step, all structures are enumerated. An individual solves for the effi
cient allocation (how much should be produced and traded of each good) for
given prices and for each structure.

In the second step, he decides what

should be produced and what should be sold and purchased, i.e. which structure
should be chosen.
Following proposition 1 in Yang [1986], for the model with increasing re
turns to specialization, an individual sells to the market only one type of
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traded good (if any) and does not buy those goods he produces. Taking this
point into account, there are seven structures which are candidates for the
optimal structures.
(1) Structure (x,y,z), i.e. an individual is completely self-sufficient .
The decision problem for this structure is
(III-1)

Max:

U = xy

x,y,z,L ,L ,L
y

X

Z

a

s.t.

y = L
y

L +L +L =L
X
y
Z

(production functions)

(endowment constraint)

Here and in the following six decision problems, we use the equivalence be-

u2

. . .
U an d maximizing
· · ·
t ween maximizing

(2) Structure (x,z/y), i.e. an individual produces x and z, and buys y.
The decision problem for this structure is
(III-2)

Max:

= xyd (1-k)

U

d s
x,y ,x ,z,L ,L
X

s.t.

X

Z

+

X

s

b
= [zL ] ,

z = LC
z

X

L + L = L
X
z
s
d
p X = PyY

(endowment constraint)
(trade balance)

X

where p

X

and p

y

(production functions)

are prices of x and y respectively. By Walras' law, we assume

xis numeraire, px = 1 and py - p.
(3) Structure (x/z, y) , i.e. an individual produces x and buys z and y.
The decision problem for this structure is
(III-3)

Max:
d

s

U = xyd(l-k)

x,y ,x ,z

s.t.

d

x + x

x

s

s

= [(1-t)zd L] b
= py

d

+ qz

d

(production functions)
(trade balance)

where q is the price of good z in terms of good x.
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(4) Structure (z/x,y), i.e. an individual produces z and purchases x and
y. The decision problem for this structure is
(III-4)

u = X d y d (1-k) 2

Max:
X

d

d

,y ,z

s.t.

s

= Lc

zs
qz

s

= x

d

(production functions)

+ PY

d

(trade balance)

(5) Structure (y/x), i.e. an individual produces y and buys x. The deci

sion problem for this structure is
(III-5)

Max:

= yxd (1-k)

U

d s
y,x ,y

y + y

s.t.

s

s

a
= L

PY =

X

(production functions)

d

(trade balance)

The following two structures are exactly the same as structures (x/z,y) and
(z/x,y) respectively except that the transaction method differs.
(6) Structure (x/L,y), i.e. an individual becomes an employer, producing

x and buying labor Landy. He purchases M L units of labor from the labor
zx
market and lets the workers specialize in the production of z.

MZX

= MZ /MX

is

the relative number of workers producing z to employers selling x, or the
number of workers

hired by the employer.

The decision problem for this

structure is
Max:

(III-6)
d

s

U

d

x,y ,x ,z ,M
s.t.

= xyd (1-k)

zx

x + xs = [(1-t')MzxzdL]b,
x

s

= py

d

+ wM

zx

zd = [(1-t")L]c (production functions)
L

(budget constraint)

where w is the wage rate in terms of good x. 1/t' is supervision efficiency
within a firm; a fraction t' of output disappears in the production process
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because of the supervision costs.

1/t" is transaction efficiency in labor

market; a fraction t" of labor service purchased by an employer disappears in
labor trade. For simplicity, I let t' denote the transaction cost coefficient
in supervising and trading labor and assume t" = 0.
is determined by the decision problem (III-6). If b

If b
~

<

1, the optimal M
zx

1, the optimal M in
zx

problem (III-6) is infinitely great. For this case the equilibrium M is de
zx
termined by free entry that maximizes the real returns to labor with respect
to M
zx
(7) Structure (L/x,y), i.e. an individual becomes an employee, he sells
--

labor and purchases x and y. The decision problem for this structure is
(III-7)

Max:
d
X

U = xdyd(l-k)

2

d
,y '

s.t.

wL = x

d

+ py

d

(budget constraint)

From each one of these problems, I can solve for the optimal decisions
including individual demand and individual supply for a given structure.

In

serting the optimal decisions into utility functions, I obtain indirect util
ity functions, as functions of relative prices.

They differ from structure to

structure.

IV.

Equilibrium

Due to the existence of increasing returns, there is a corner solution
for each structure. By the combinations of these structures, we have several
market structures. For each market structure, there is a candidate for equi
librium. Such a candidate is an analogue of a corner solution.

I call it a

corner equilibrium. In subsection IV.A, I solve for the corner equilibrium for
each market structure. In subsection IV. B,
corner equilibrium.

I solve for the Pareto optimum

Finally, I identify full equilibrium among these corner

equilibria and prove that it is the Pareto optimum.
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IV .A

The Market Structures

From logically consistent combinations of the structures listed in the
previous section, I can obtain four market structures,

I will refer to them

simply as "markets". These are
(i) Autarky. All individuals choose structure (x,y,z).
(ii) Partial division of labor in producing final goods, I refer to this
market as P. This market is a combination of structure (x,z/y) and structure
(y/x).
(iii) Complete division of labor without firms, I refer to this market as
C. This market is a combination of structures (x/z,y), (z/x,y) and (y/x).
(iv) Complete division of labor with firms, I refer to this market as F.
This market consists of structures (x/L,y), (L/x,y) and (y/x). 4
It is easy to see that market F and market C have the same organizational
structure of production and different transaction arrangements. Market F re
places the transaction of intermediate goods in the market between individuals
by the transactions of intermediate goods within a firm and trades of labor in
the market. As Alchian and Cheung pointed out, a firm replaces the external
market for products by an internal market for intermediate service within a
firm and external market for factors. In other words, people can choose al
ternative contractual arrangements in the external market to organize the di
vision of labor and trade other than the wage contract associated with firms.

4

It could be proven that other markets, e.g. a combination of autarky struc
ture and another market or a combination of structure (x,z/y) and market C,
cannot occur in equilibrium.

Therefore, we are not concerned with them.

A

formal proof of a proposition similar to this statement can be found in
Yang [1987a].
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We should explain why the wage contract supersedes other alternative contract
arrangements and cannot just take the institution of the firm as given.
Let the number of individuals selling good (or factor) i be M.; I can ob1

tain aggregate demand (or supply) in a given market by multiplying M. with
1

individual demand for (or supply of) good i. Because the total number of all
individuals is a constant M, we need solve only for the relative numbers of
individuals choosing different structures. That is, I can solve M from tM. =
S

M if I know all other M. (i
1

Letting aggregate

~

1

s).

demand equal

aggregate supply,

we have the market

clearing conditions in a given market. Free entry will make the utilities in
different structures equal to one another.
For market P, for example, the market clearing condition is
(IV-la)

M

X

X

s

= MX
y

d

and the utility equalization condition is
(IV-lb)

d

d

xy (1-k) = yx (1-k)

where M is the number of individuals choosing structure (x,z/y) and M is the
X
y
number of individuals choosing structure (y/x) and M + M = M.
X
y
For a given market, if we haven traded goods, then we have n-1 independent market clearing conditions and n-1 relative prices of traded goods. If a
market includes m structures, then we have m-1 utility equalization conditions
and m-1 relative numbers of individuals choosing different structures. From
direct calculation, we can show th-at there is a unique corner equilibrium for
each one of the four markets. A corner equilibrium is defined by n-1 corner
equilibrium relative prices and m-1 corner equilibrium relative numbers of
individuals choosing different structures. The corner equilibria in the four
markets are the candidates for equilibrium.
V. B

The Pareto Optimum Corner Equilibrium
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For a given market, I can construct a problem to solve for the restricted
Pareto optimal allocation.

By "restricted",

I

shall mean that the market

structure is given. In this problem, I maximize the utility in a structure
with respect to the quantities of all goods and subject to production func
tions, the balance between the total consumption and total production of each
good, and the condition that the utilities in other structures are not less
than some constants. By manipulating the algebra, it is easy to prove that
each corner equilibrium found in the previous subsection is a restricted Par
eto optimal allocation. Comparing all corner equilibrium utilities in differ
ent markets, I will identify the corner equilibrium with maximum utility. I
define such a corner equilibrium as the Pareto optimum corner equilibrium. It
is easy to see that this corner equilibrium satisfies the necessary conditions
for the Pareto optimum. Here the Pareto optimum is defined similarly to the
restricted Pareto optimal allocation, except that there is no constraint im
posed on the choice of market.
From direct calculation and comparison of the corner equilibrium utilities in four markets, I can show the following proposition
Propos ition 1
For b < 1, we have that
(1) Complete division of labor without firms (market C) is the Pareto op
timum corner equilibrium if f(t,k)

-ln(l-t)-ln(l-k)l/Z, g
af/ak >

o,

ag/ab >

=

o and

<

g(b,

c)

and t

<

t', where f(t,k)

lnb+(l/b-l)ln(l-b)+cln(l+l/c)+bln(l+c),

ag/ac >

at/at>

=

0,

o.

(2) Complete division of labor with firms (market F) is the Pareto opti
mum corner equilibrium if f(t', k) < g(b, c) and t' < t.

-13- ·

(3) Autarky is the Pareto optimum corner equilibrium if k > 1-h(a,b,c),

where h(a,b,c) = 4[b(l+c)]b(l+c)aa/[b(l+ c)+a]b(l+c)+a, ah/aa < O, ah/ab < O,
and ah/ac

<

o.

(4) Partial division of labor (market P) is the Pareto optimum corner
equilibrium if f(t, k) > g(b ,c), f(t' ,k) > g(b ,c) and k < 1-h(a,b ,c). 5

In other words, if transaction efficiency is great, then the Pareto opti
mum corner equilibrium is associated with a high level of division of labor
and if transaction efficiency in the labor market and supervision efficiency
within firms are sufficiently greater than transaction efficiency in the mar
ket for intermediate goods, then the Pareto optimum corner equilibrium is as
sociated with the market including firms.
IV .C

Equilibrium and the Pareto Optimum.

In this subsection, I prove
Proposition 2
For the model set out in the previous subsections, the equilibrium is the
Pareto optimum.

In order to establish this proposition, it suffices to
(i) show that the Pareto optimum corner equilibrium is an equilibrium;
and
(ii) show that all non-Pareto optimum corner equilibria are not equilibria.

5

If b ~ 1, f(t,k) and g(b,c) will be changed, the major conclusion will,
however, not be changed. The algebra to show this proposition is in the Ap
pendix.

· -14-

It is easy to show (i) because the Pareto optimum corner equilibrium en
sures a full maximization of utility for each individual and all local equi
libria satisfy all the necessary conditions for full equilibrium except for
ensuring the full maximization of individual utilities.
To prove (ii), we must "break" all non-Pareto optimum corner equilibria.
Assume that f(t,k) < g(b,c), i.e. the complete division of labor (market C) is
an equilibrium and the Pareto optimum and other markets have non-Pareto opti
mum corner equilibria. For example, for local equilibrium in market P (the
partial division of labor), there are corner equilibrium prices p, q and cor
ner equilibrium utility U(P). All individuals know that they can choose any
one of seven structures.

Each individual can insert the corner equilibrium

prices p and q of market Pinto indirect utilities of the structures in market

C. If these utilities are greater than U(P), then individuals have incentives
to break corner equilibrium in market P under corner equilibrium prices in
market P.
In market C, there are three structures. The indirect utility functions
in the three structures are

GI
2b/(1-b)
X pq

(IV-2a)

uX =

(IV-2b)

uy = GyP

(IV-2c)

uz = Gz q 2 /p

where U , U , and U
X

y

Z

are indirect utility functions for structures (x/z,y),

(y/x), and (z/x,y) respectively.

G. is constant depending on L, k, t, a, b,
1

and c.
Let p' and q' be equilibrium prices in market C; we have utility equali
zation conditions in market C:
(IV-3)
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where U(C) is a constant depending on all parameters. Recalling that U(P) is
corner equilibrium utility in market P; the assumption that market C is Pareto
optimum corner equilibrium implies that U(C) > U(P).
Individuals will compare the utilities in the structures of market Cun
der prices of market P, i.e.

Ux(p,q), Uy(p), and Uz(p,q) with U(P).

If any

one of the following inequalities holds, then individuals have incentives to
shift to a structure of market C from market P under the prices in market P,
i.e., market Pis broken.
U(P)

(IV-4a)

Ux(p,q)

(IV-4b)

u (p) ) U(P)
y

(IV-4c)

Uz(p,q)

>

>

U(P)

Note, here we are in a Walrasian regime, each individual choosing a structure
for given prices and not concerned with the behavior of other individuals.
Because U(C) > U(P), one semi-inequality in (IV-4) will hold if one semi-ine
quality in (IV-5) holds.
(IV-5a)

U (p,q)

(IV-5b)

U (p)
y

(IV-5c)

U (p,q)
z

X

~

~

U (p' ,q') = U(C)
X

U (p') = U(C)
y
~

U (p' ,q') = U(C)
z

where the equalities are based on the utility equalization condition (IV-3).
(IV-4) and (IV-5) imply that if U.(p,q) ~ U.(p',q') = U(C), then U.(p,q)
1

1

1

>

U(P) since U(C) > U(P). Concretely, (IV-5) is
(IV-6a)

Gx/pq2b/(1-b) ~ Gx/p'q'2b/(1-b)

(IV-6b)

Gyp~ GyP'

(IV-6c)

2
Gzq /p

~ Gzq' 2 /p'

It is easy to see that in (IV-6) at least one semi-inequality must hold for
any p, q and p', q'. This implies that individuals have incentives to shift to

· -16-

at least one structure in market C from market P under corner equilibrium
prices in P. That is, the non-Pareto optimum corner equilibrium in market Pis
not full equilibrium.
Repeating this procedure, we can break any of the other non-Pareto opti
mum corner equilibrium. Therefore, proposition 2 has been proven.
Propositions 1 and 2 imply that complete division of labor without firms
(market C) is an equilibrium (and also the Pareto optimum) if transaction ef
ficiencies 1/t and 1/k and/or the extent of increasing returns to specializa
tion in producing intermediate goods are sufficiently great relative to the
extent of increasing returns to specialization in producing final goods. If
the extent of increasing returns to specialization and/or transaction effi
ciency are sufficiently small, then equilibrium and the Pareto optimum are
autarky.

For intermediate increasing returns to specialization and trans

action efficiencies, the equilibrium and the Pareto optimum are the partial
division of labor (market P).

If transaction efficiency of intermediate goods

within a firm and transaction efficiency in labor market are sufficiently
great relative to transaction efficiency of intermediate goods in external
market and the complete division of labor is Pareto superior to less division
of labor, then equilibrium is associated with the market with firms. In other
words, we have
.Corollary 1
Increasing transaction efficiency and/or increasing extent of the econo
mies of specialization will lead to a greater equilibrium (and Pareto optimal)
level of division of labor.

Moreover, equilibrium will be associated with the

market including firms if supervision efficiency within firms and transaction
efficiency in labor market are sufficiently greater than transaction efficiency
in the market for intermediate goods.
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This corollary has answered the question why firms substitute the exter
nal market for intermediate goods with the internal markets for intermediate
goods within a firm and the external markets for

labor.

Furthermore,

if

f(t,k) > g(b,c) (market Pis Pareto superior to market C) and f(t' ,k) < g(b,c)
(market Fis Pareto superior to market P), then the equilibrium will be market
P (involving no division of labor in intermediate goods) and is not the Pareto
optimum when there are no firms. The equilibrium will involve such division of
labor and is Pareto optimum if firms are set up. This brings us to
Corollary 2
If transaction efficiency in labor market and supervision efficiency within
firms are sufficiently greater than transaction efficiency in the market for in
termediate goods and market P is Pareto superior to market C, i.e. market C
(without firms) is not equilibrium, then the institutional innovation of firms

will increase the level of division of labor and improve productivity and gen
eral welfare.

These two corollaries imply that the evolution of the division of labor
in roundabout production (intermediate goods or services) and improvement of
transaction efficiency are two sides of the rationale for the institution of
the firm. Moreover, the emergence of the firm may increase the level of divi
sion of labor thereby increasing the total transaction cost although the firm
will improve transaction efficiency if the benefits from the finer division of
labor outweigh the increased transaction costs.
V.

Comparative Statics

In this subsection, we will first discuss the comparative statics within
a given market, then discuss the comparative statics across market structures.
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Assume that equilibrium is associated with market F and all parameters
may change under constraint f(t',k)

<

g(b,c). Then we will obtain the compar

ative statics within the market by manipulating the eq~ilibrium conditions.
(1) The ratio of intermediate products to final products characterizes
the "roundaboutness" of production in an economy.

This roundaboutness will

increase with the extent of increasing returns to specialization. Formally,
let the ratio be R

s
= MZ wL/(MX x s +M__py
),
y-

where M, M, and M are the numbers
X

y

Z

of individuals choosing structures (x/z,y), (y/x), and (z/x,y) respectively.
s

MzwL is the total value of intermediate good z and Mxx +M~ys is the total
trade value of final goods. Then we have
aR/ab >

(V-1)

o,

if 3Ll-b > blnL-1 R

= 2b/(3-b+Lb-l).

From the U. S. input-output tables, I can obtain data on the roundaboutness.
These data indicate a significant increase in the roundaboutness over time.
The ratio of values of intermediate goods to consumer goods are .44 in 1947,
.54 in 1958, .55 in 1961, .57 in 1963, .62 in 1967 (see Department of Commerce
[1975]).
(2) Assume that good z is a machine or other capital good; the capital
labor ratio in our model increases as transaction efficiency is improved. Let
this ratio S = M wL/ML; we have
z
(V-2)

as/at' <

o,

as/ak <

o,

as;ac >

o,

as/ab> o

where M wL is the total output value of intermediate (capital) goods, ML is
z
the total quantity of labor, and
S = [bl+b(l-b)l-b(l-t)b (1-k)b/2Lb(c+l)-1]/[3-2b+b(l-k)l/2].

(3) The number of workers hired by an employer, M

ZX

= M /M
Z

X

increases as

the extent of increasing returns to specialization, "b" and transaction efficiency, 1/k, i.e.
(V-3)

1 2
M = b(l-k) / /(l-b) and
zx

aM

zx

;ab>
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o,

aM

zx

/ak

<

o.

The algebra to show (II-7)-(II-9) is in the Appendix.

For different mar

kets, I can solve for corner equilibrium ratios of intermediate products to
final products,

corner equilibrium ratios of capital to labor, and of trade

volume to income. By comparing these ratios in different markets and using the
corollaries 1 and 2, we can obtain other results on the comparative statics
across market structures. 6 From direct calculation, we can show that the three
ratios will increase as the market evolves from autarky to the developed di
vision of labor and this evolution may be induced by an improved transaction
efficiency and/or an increased extent of increasing returns to specialization.
The emergence of firms will be related to this evolution of market structure
if the institution of the firm can be used to improve transaction efficiency.
If I specify production functions for many intermediate activities, then
equilibrium may be associated with new firms specializing in finer subprofes
sions of intermediate activities if the gains from finer division of labor and
from the decrease in transaction costs among subprofessions within such firms
equal the increase in transaction costs between such firms and other firms at
the margin. The institutional and technical innovations facilitating the im
provement of transaction efficiency will shift equilibrium to a increasingly
finer division of labor in intermediate activities.

Such evolution of market

structure and the institution of the firm will increase the capital-labor ra
tio in the whole economy. Therefore, the increase in the capital-labor ratio
is not only a matter of technical conditions and available inputs, but also a
matter of the evolution of the market and firm structure.
VI.

6

Remarks on the Model

More general analysis on the comparative statics across markets can be
found in Yang [ 1986] .
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Such a model has several merits.
(1) Primary production functions are relevant to individuals and each in
dividual is able to produce any good. The prices are determined by the number
of individuals choosing different structures, while free entry prevents any
individual from manipulating these numbers.

Therefore, there is no monopoly

power in the market even though the equilibrium number of actual producers for
a good may be small if the equilibrium is associated with a high level of di
vision of labor. In other words, increasing returns to specialization is com
patible with a Walrasian regime. In our model, a decentralized market can in
tegrate increasing returns to specialization (internal to individuals) into
the economies of the division of labor (external to individuals).
Moreover, Mills' production function is relevant to the relation between
productivity and economic organization rather than to technology itself. This
production function distinguishes increasing returns to specialization from
the increasing returns to scale and the gains to trade based on comparative
advantages.

Therefore, our model based on the Mills' production function can

be used to highlight the relation between the evolution of economic institu
tion, the division of labor, and economic growth.
(2)

For market

F the

individual

production

functions

in structures

(x/L,y,z) and (L/x,y) are aggregated into a production function of the firm.
This aggregate production function looks

like the conventional production

function associated with U-shaped average cost curves (if b
global increasing returns to scale (if b

~

<

1) or that with

1). However, the conventional pro

duction function is irrelevant to the decision problem of the optimal level of
self-sufficiency and in fact our individual production function differs from
the production function associated with U-shaped average cost curves or that
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with global increasing returns to scale. Our model can be used to explain a
simultaneous evolution of the division of labor, the market, and the firm.
The evolution looks like a shift of the structure of production functions
since new traded goods, new professions, and new firms will come to being and
productivity will be improved as the division of labor and market evolve.
From direct calculation, we can show that the trade volume of final goods
in the market is greater in market F than in market P

if f(t',k) < g(b,c).

This implies that the evolution of the division of labor from market P to
market F not only increases the exchange volume of intermediate service (or
goods) within a firm, but also increases the trade volume of final goods in
the market. This supports Alchian's idea about a simultaneous development of
the firm and market.
In the equilibrium of market F, the number of workers hired by an entre
preneur is M /M, an increasing function of transaction efficiency 1/k, where
Z

X

M is the number of workers producing z in firms and MX is the number of emz
ployers.

This implies that an improvement of transaction efficiency will in-

crease the equilibrium level of division of labor,

thereby increasing the

equilibrium number of workers hired by an entrepreneur and the equilibrium
scale of the firm.

7

For great supervision efficiency within a firm and transaction efficiency
in the market for labor, relative to transaction efficiency in the market for
intermediate goods, propositions 1 and 2 tell us that equilibrium is associ
ated with the institution of the firm.

7

However, these two propositions mean

In Vassilakis [1986], a model with increasing returns to scale is used to
justify the increase in the worker~employer ratio based on the evolution of
the division of labor.
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that equilibrium will shift to corner equilibrium with the market for inter
mediate goods from one with firms if transaction efficiency in the market for
intermediate goods is sufficiently improved relative to supervision efficiency
within firms

and transaction efficiency in labor market.

In other words,

whether individual professions are integrated into a firm or a firm disinte
grated into separate professions depends upon the difference between trans
action efficiencies in markets F and C.
(3) In this paper I adopt a multiple-step approach to solving for the
equilibrium. This approach is flexible enough to accommodate different hier
archical structures of the firm and transaction network. For example,

I can

specify a transaction network associated with piece rate contracts in the firm
and a transaction network associated with subcontract arrangements

in the

market, then I solve for two corner equilibria. The corner equilibrium utili
ties in the two market structures will be different because of the different
transaction

efficiencies of

these transaction networks.

Investigating the

comparative statics, I can see under what condition equilibrium will shift
from a corner equilibrium to another one.

Also, this multiple-step approach

can be used to extend the model in this paper to contain many final and in
termediate goods and many roundabout professions in the division of labor.
This multiple-step approach simulates a searching process for the Pareto
optimum by

a

trial-and-error method.

In

reality,

this

searches for a Pareto optimal allocation of resources

process

not

only

for a given market

structure, but also searches for a Pareto optimal structure of the firm and
market.
If we interpret z as the management services required in producing good x
and assume that the individual producing z may set up a firm by hiring the
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individuals producing x, then we can show that equilibrium will be associated
with the institution of the firm when the transaction efficiency in labor
trade is sufficiently greater than the transaction efficiency in trade of
management services.
The model of this sort differs from that without management services. In
the model without management service,

goods are tangible commodities.

management services· in the revised model is

But

intangible knowledge property,

which is usually in the form of know-how. For such models, we will have prob
lems of information.
Indeed, in the model without management problem, there implicitly is a
problem of information. In our model, the original system of production func
tions is identical for all individuals.

However, if people specialize in the

production of different goods and/or have different levels of specialization,
productivities of various goods will differ from individual to individual in
equilibrium, i.e. there are comparative advantages in production based on in
creasing returns to specialization. 8 Such comparative advantages based on in
creasing returns to specialization imply that an individual specializing in a
certain production process knows more about this process than the individuals
specializing in other production processes. In fact, the gains from trade in
such a model are based on the difference in knowledge possessed by individuals

8

When there is no increasing returns to specialization, if production func
tion is identical for all people, productivities of all goods in equilibri
um will be identical for all people.

The discussion on the distinction of

comparative advantage based on increasing returns to specialization from
the comparative advantage based on constant returns can be found in Yang
[1987a].
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specializing in different professions. However, in the model without manage
ment problem, individuals do not directly trade knowledge. They trade tangible
goods or service which embody the specific information on how to efficiently
produce them (implicitly represented by prices).

In the revised model, indi

viduals may directly trade management knowledge in the market place. But the
intangible commodity,

like all other commodities of this sort has serious

problem of transaction. First, it is'extremely difficult to delimit the rights
to contract for such intangible commodities because of prohibitively great
cost of keeping an owner's exclusive property rights over such commodities.
Second, the costs of enforcing the payments from those individuals having used
management knowledge to the owner of the knowledge are extremely great because
of the existence of "spill-over". 9

9

There are three ways to address the problem of intangible commodity:

(1)

There is no market for the intangible commodity because the rights to con
tract on the commodity cannot be delimited. (2) There is no market for the
intangible commodity because pricing costs (costs of metering the quantity
traded, costs of finding price, and costs of collecting payment) are pro
hibitively great. (3) In the market, allocation of the intangible commodity
is not efficient because of externalities. Essentially, these three ways
are closely related to one another. For example, we can say that the rights
to contract cannot be delimited because of great pricing costs. Or we can
say that there are externalities because there is no the market for the in
tangible goods (pollution or some knowledge), while the lack of the markets
is due to transaction costs that are too large. The relation and distinc
tion among these three methods needs to be clarified in further research.
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In other words, pricing costs of management knowledge in a market are so
high that a market for management services is sometimes almost infeasible.
Hence, using the revised model it is easy to show that the equilibrium in the
division of labor between producing intangible management knowledge and tan
gible goods involves the institution of the firm and a market for labor rather
than a market for management service. The function of the institution of the
firm is thus to replace the market for management knowledge or other intangi
ble commodities (e.g.

organizational structure of large corporation itself is

a kind of property) with the market for labor or other tangible commodities
(e.g. other factors or the large corporation itself) in order to avoid ex
tremely great transaction costs in the developed division of labor between the
production of intangible property and the production of tangible commodity.

10

Such replacement is a common economic phenomenon. For example, TV sta
tions replace trading of information between TV program producers and their
audience with trading among advertisement agents, the TV stations, and the
customers of the TV program and goods advertised by the agents. This is be
cause pricing efficiency in the latter trade is much greater than in the for
mer trade.

It is expensive to monitor who watches which TV program and to

collect payments from each viewer. Therefore, the latter trade may be Pareto
superior to· the former though everybody knows that the latter trade causes
some distortion by forcing the audience to watch advertisements that they
might prefer not to see.

10

The market for labor has a similar (moral hazard) problem:

transaction

costs to specify the quality of labor, i.e. effort, are great. Hence, the
institution with relatively less serious problem of transaction cost will
be prefered.
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In other words, the institution of the firm may be used to efficiently
protect intangible knowledge property and improve its pricing efficiency. In
particular, the trade of the firms themselves (e.g. sale of a large corpora
tion) can efficiently delimit the exclusive rights to contract over intangible
property of management knowledge.
According to the theory produced by a model of this sort, any. tax on
trade (domestic and international) is harmful to economic growth and general
welfare. Such a tax will decrease transaction efficiency and thereby decrease
the equilibrium level of division of labor.

But this theory by no means im

plies that all governments that taxing their residents are irrational.

The

theory in this thesis can in fact be used to justify taxation. Because gov
ernments produce many intangible commodities and the transaction efficiency
for such commodities is extremely low, we need taxation to finance the pro
duction of such intangible properties.
If the firm is not available as an institution and the market for manage
ment services involves transaction costs that are too great, then there does
not exit an equilibrium with a complete division of labor.

The individuals

who produce goods and need the management knowledge will be free riders and
nobody will be willing to specialize in management. So called "market failure"
will occur. In this sense, the institution of the firm can be used to overcome
this "market failure." However, the firm is a type of market system. It re
places the market for management services by the markets for factors and in
ternal market within firms. In this sense, the function of the firm is to re
place deficient markets by efficient ones.
Indeed, there is an almost unlimited number of feasible institutional ar
rangements if the products are many and the division of labor in roundabout
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activities is developed. The function of a decentralized market in searching
for the efficient institutions and market structures may be much more impor
tant than its function in allocating resources within a certain institution
and market structure.

Conclusions

In this paper, we formalize Coase's notion of the role of the firm. The
basic approach here is a typically neoclassical one of utility and production
functions. However, in specifying production function, we emphasize the con
cept of localized technology, proposed by Sah and Stiglitz [1986]. A produc
tion function is specified for individuals and labor is specific for each in
dividual. For traditional production functions, employers just put labor and
other factors into "production functions" and obtain output from such black
boxes.

What is the internal organization of the black box, what implications

does the internal organization have for the traditional theory of equilibrium,
and why does an economy evolve from autarky without firms to one with the de
veloped division of labor within firms and among the firms?

The model in this

paper allow us to open the black box and to answer these questions.
In our model, the function of the firm is not only to put input factors
into the black box of the production function and to pick up outputs from the
black box, but also to organize the individuals' production functions into a
combined one, which may have greater productivity than the combination of
these individual production functions in. the market without firms.

This is

because the institution of the firm may be used to improve transaction effi
ciency, thereby increasing the equilibrium level of the division of labor.
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Based on the theory of firms formalized in this paper, we can show that
all the results concerning trade and economic growth derived from the models
with increasing returns to specialization in Yang [1986] and [1987] continue
to hold when firms are introduced.
Combining the approach in this paper with the approach to the dynamic
model in Yang [1987b], we can show that the division of labor evolves over
time even

if there

is not

exogenous progress

in transaction

efficiency.

Whether this evolution involves the institution of the firm depends on the
relative extent of increasing returns to specialization in trading labor to
that in trading intermediate goods.
The most important result of this paper concerns two functions of the
free market system (free price system and free enterprise system) beside its
function in allocating resources for a given level of division of labor (mar
ket structure) and a given institutional arrangement. The first one of these
two functions is to search for the efficient level of division of labor (mar
ket structure). The second one is to search for the efficient institutional
arrangements.
Accordingly, we find three types of distortions that can result from in
appropriate government intervention: (i) The distortion of resource allocation
for given levels of division of labor and institutional arrangement. This is
the major concern of the traditional microeconomics. (ii) The distortion of
organizational structure. (iii) The distortion of institutional arrangements.
For example, if a government places a tax on business sales at proper rates
such that relative prices do not deviate from efficient ones, then the tax
will not

cause allocative

distortion.

However,

such a

tax will

increase

transaction costs in the market for management services, thereby causing the
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equilibrium to have a lower level of division of labor than without such a
tax. Moreover, such a tax favours the institution of the firm and the market
for labor over the market for management services. Hence, the equilibrium in
stitutional arrangement may deviate from the efficient one if the efficient
one is in fact the market for management services.

Appendix

The Algebra to Show Proposition 1 and Comparative Statics

In this appendix, I first present the algebra to solve for corner equi
libria in four markets one by one. Then I present the algebra of comparative
statics in market F.
(1) First, I consider marekt A. This marekt consists of one structure
The decision problem for this structure is given in (III-1).

(x,y,z).

The

optimal decisions of (III-1) are
L = bL/(bc+b+a)

(1-1)

L = aL/(bc+b+a)
y

X

z

= LcZ

x

(2) In marekt P

=

(zL )b
X

a

y = L
y

L = bcL/(bc+b+a)
z

U = xy
A

there are two structures (x,z/y) and (y/x).

sion problem for structure (x,z/y) is given in (III-2).

The deci

The optimal decisions

in this structure are
(2-1)

d

U

d
= xy (1-k)

The decision problem for structure (y/x) is given in (III-5).

The opti-

= L/(c+l)

L

X

L = cL/(c+l)
z

X

= X

s

= PY

X

where pis the price of yin terms of x.

mal decisions in this structure are
(2-2)

L

y

=L

y

= x d /p = L a /2

U

y

= yxd (1-k)

Let Ux = Uy' I obtain the utility equalization condition in market P which
gives corner equilibrium price
(2-3)
Inserting (2-3) into U or U, I find the real returns to labor in market P
X
y
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(2-4)
(3) In marekt C, there are three structures (x/z,y), (z/x,y), and (y/x).
The decision problem for structure (x/z,y) is given in (III-3). The optimal
decisions in this structure are
(3-1)

U

X

d

= xy (1-k)

where q is the price of z in terms of x.
The decision problem for structure (z/x,y) is given in (III-4). The opti
mal decisions in this structure are
(3-2)

x

d

= PYd

C

= qL /2

uz = X d y d (1-k) 2

The optimal decisions in structure (y/x) are given by (2-2).

Let U = U
X

y

= U, the utility equalization conditions give the corner equilibrium prices
z

in marekt C.
p = Lbc+b-a(l-k)b/2bb(l- b)l-b(l-t)b

(3-3)

q

= Lb-c+cb(l-k)(b-1)/2bb( l-

b)l-b(l-t)b

Inserting (3-3) into U, I find the real returns to labor in market C
(3-4)
Note, here I assume that b < 1.
(4) In marekt F, there are three structures (x/L,y), (L/x,y), and (y/x).
The decision problem for structure (x/z,y) is given in (III-6). The optimal
decisions in this structure are

U = xy d (1-k)
X

where M
is the relative number of employees to employers and w is the price
zx
of labor in terms of x.
The decision problem for structure (L/x,y) is given in (III-7). The opti
mal decisions in this structure are
(4-2)

x

d

= PYd

= wL/2

uL = X d y d (1-k) 2
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The optimal decisions in structure (y/x) are given by (2-2).

Let U = U
X

y

= UL' the utility equalization conditions give the corner equilibrium prices
in marekt F.
(4-3)
Inserting (4-3) into U, I find the real returns to labor in market F
(4-4)
Comparing UA in (1-1), UP in (2-4), UC in (3-4), and UF in (4-4), I ob
tain proposition 1.
Next, I present the algebra of comparative statics in market F.

Accord

ing to (II-7), the roundaboutness in market Fis defined as
(5-1)

R

s
s
s
= M wL/(M x +M__py) = M wL/(x +M
Z

X

y-

ZX

yx

s
py)

where M. is the number of individuals producing good i and M.. is the relative
1

1J

number of individuals producing good i to individuals producing good j. The
numerator of (5-1) is the total value of intermediate products and denominator
is the total value of consumer goods. Here, wand pare given by (4-3). In
serting w given by (4-3) into M given in (4-1), I find
zx
(5-2)
From the marekt clearing condition for goody
(5-3)

d

d

My
+MyL=My
XX
Z
y

s

where y~ is the quantity of y demanded by individuals producing good i, the
1
quantity and ys are given by the individual optimal decisions, I find
(5-4)
Inserting the value of pin (4-3) and the value of M in (5-2) into (5-4), I
zx
can obtain the value of M

yx

Inserting the values of w, p, and M.

1X

into (5-1), I find

(5-5)

It is not difficult to drive (II-7) from (5-5).
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According to (V-2), the capital-labor ratio is defined as
(5-6)

S

= MwL/ML
= MwL/(M
+MZ +My )L = MZXw/(l+M +M )
Z
Z
X
ZX
yx

where numerator is the total value of capital (intermediate) goods and the
denominator is the total amount of labor. w is given by (4-3), M and M are
.
zx
yx
given by (5-2) and (5-4) respectively. Therefore, I can derive Sin (V-2) from
(5-6), (4-3), (5-2), and (5-4).
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